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Tensions in the Caribbean Basin and Perón's ambitions during the Early Cold War

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Abstract

This paper examines how regional dynamics in the Caribbean Basin during the early Cold War shaped Argentina's diplomatic efforts, while also analysing the diverse responses from Caribbean nations. This dual focus highlights the interplay between Argentina's ambitions and the local and regional geopolitical, economic, and ideological contexts. These exchanges centred on three key themes: mitigating market gaps from agroexport reliance through agricultural and industrial imports; addressing rising anti-colonial sentiment; and navigating domestic tensions that divided pro-democratic governments from dictatorships. Drawing on diplomatic sources from nine countries and building on a historiographical resurgence focused on interactions among Latin American countries, this study highlights how these interactions helped shape the evolving political and economic landscape of the Caribbean Basin during this transformative period. *Keywords*: Anticommunism, postwar, Caribbean Basin, Argentina, Central America, Cold War.

Resumen: Tensiones en la cuenca del Caribe y las ambiciones de Perón en los primeros años de la Guerra Fría

Este artículo examina cómo la dinámica regional en la cuenca del Caribe durante los primeros años de la Guerra Fría influyó en los esfuerzos diplomáticos de Argentina, al tiempo que analiza las diversas respuestas de las naciones caribeñas. Este doble enfoque pone de relieve la interacción entre las ambiciones argentinas y los contextos geopolíticos, económicos e ideológicos locales y regionales. Estos intercambios se centraron en tres temas clave: mitigar las brechas de mercado derivadas de la dependencia agroexportadora mediante importaciones agrícolas e industriales; abordar el creciente sentimiento anticolonial; y sortear las tensiones internas que dividían a los gobiernos prodemocráticos de las dictaduras. Basándose en fuentes diplomáticas de nueve países y en un resurgimiento historiográfico centrado en las interacciones entre los países latinoamericanos, este estudio resalta cómo estas interacciones ayudaron a configurar el cambiante panorama político y económico de la cuenca del Caribe durante este período transformador. *Palabras clave*: Anticomunismo, posguerra, cuenca, Caribe, Argentina, América Central, Guerra Fría.

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Introduction

In January 1947, Argentine Senator Diego Luis Molinari embarked on a tour across the Caribbean Basin, which includes Mexico, Central America, Venezuela, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic. His delegation comprised up to sixty members, a substantial budget, and, according to Molinari, executive powers granted by Argentine President Juan Domingo Perón. Known as the Molinari Commission, this mission represented Argentina's effort to align a part of its geopolitical interests with the region's evolving priorities. Three key topics came to define the regional agenda in the coming years: commerce and investment around agricultural and industrial products; rising anti-colonial sentiment; and domestic political tensions spilling into regional dynamics, leading pro-democratic governments to seek the isolation of dictatorships. This article examines how regional dynamics in the Caribbean Basin during the early Cold War shaped Argentina's diplomatic efforts, while also analysing the diverse responses from Caribbean nations. This dual focus highlights the interplay between Argentina's ambitions and the local and regional geopolitical, economic, and ideological contexts. It uses the Molinari Commission's tour as a starting point to analyse the broader interactions between Caribbean Basin countries and Argentina.

Molinari's endeavours and charisma sparked varied reactions. The Brazilian ambassador in Havana described him as "an intelligent and shrewd man" with "theatrical eloquence," while a Chilean diplomat praised his "strong personality" and absence of the "typical Argentine pose"[1] (AHI, 1947; AHCC). Beyond mere descriptions and historical prejudices, these comments reveal the sensitivities of Argentina's regional rivals regarding its outreach to the Caribbean Basin – an effort the Chilean ambassador in Guatemala characterized as "hegemonic." Both Chile and Brazil pursued similar strategies, albeit with fewer resources, less strength, and less coherence. As in the 1960s and 1980s, the Caribbean Basin garnered significant attention from continental powers, fuelled by geopolitical ambitions and the potential for escalating tensions to redefine the balance of power across the continent.

The Caribbean Basin region in the postwar years was defined by political and ideological polarization, manifested through diplomatic, political, and military channels. At the same time, their economies experienced significant growth, driven by soaring prices for primary exports, which allowed for greater political and international engagement. This combination of factors led to conflicts with continental repercussions. New historiography underscores how external powers sought to assert their influence within this web of emerging tensions and opportunities, reflecting the region's growing importance in continental politics (García, 2012; Moulton, 2015; Véliz, 2021). Chile quickly dispatched trade envoys and joined Uruguay, the United States and Mexico in advocating for the isolation of dictatorships, aligning themselves with the region's democracies, while the latter remained a continuous source of arms. Meanwhile, Brazil and Great Britain adopted radical stances, actively financing and arming key authoritarian

regimes. For its part, after years of regional isolation, Perón aimed to align a segment of Argentina's strategic interests with the shifting dynamics of the region at the dawn of the Cold War.

Perón approached the region with carefully calibrated objectives. Financing, investment, and trade advantages were offered broadly across the region, yielding mixed but generally positive outcomes. However, political and military support was reserved for the region's autocracies, following the alignment of democratic governments with the United States in isolating Argentina. After the Cold War's anti-communist turn and Perón's increasingly authoritarian domestic and international policies, this alignment became even more pronounced. Rather than focusing solely on Argentine foreign policy, the article emphasizes mutual interactions, exploring how the Molinari mission serves as a case study of intra-regional diplomacy in Latin America. The narrative frames Argentina's actions within the broader context of Cold War-era intra-regional relations, uncovering the interplay of geopolitical traditions, economic interests, and ideological alignments that shaped these exchanges.

Recent studies have begun revisiting Argentina's interactions with Central America and the Caribbean after a long hiatus since Armony's work (1997). Research by Julieta Rostica's GECA group and Molly Avery has shed light on Argentina's role during the Central American crisis of the late 1970s (Sala, 2018; Molinari, 2020; Avery, 2020, 2021; Rostica, 2021, 2022; Consuegra, 2021). However, earlier periods, particularly the postwar and early Cold War years, remain largely overlooked, despite evidence of the region's economic and political significance, with scholarly focus favouring ties with the United States, the United Kingdom, and neighbouring countries (Belini, 2012; Rinke, 2017; Rostica, Pedroni & Salas, 2015; Semán, 2017, pp. 206-211).

The article moves beyond single-country and U.S.-centred methodologies, emphasizing a complex web of reciprocal interactions among diverse actors across multiple scales. Recent Latin American Cold War historiography highlights the importance of examining overlapping social, economic, and ideological conflicts, which in this case entails a particular focus on their interactions with Argentina. Scholars advocate a transnational approach that balances regional particularities (Saull, 2004; Brands, 2012; Harmer, 2014; Rabe, 2014; Pettinà & Sánchez, 2015; Marchesi, 2017; Taracena & García, 2017; García, 2018; Joseph, 2019; Casals, 2020; Booth, 2020; Rostica, 2021; McPherson, 2021; Ioris & Pettinà, 2023; Drinot, 2023).

The closure of diplomatic archives across much of the region, coupled with the sporadic destruction of Argentine records during the last military dictatorship, poses significant challenges for research. However, materials from Cuba (located in Berlin), Mexico, and Guatemala, along with reports from British, U.S., Chilean, Brazilian, and Uruguayan embassies – produced by rival diplomatic structures meticulously monitoring Argentine actions – help bridge these gaps. These diverse sources complement the fragmented records from both the Caribbean and Argentina, providing a broader perspective and deeper insight

into Argentina's interactions with the region. They illuminate the complex interplay between state and non-state actors in the Caribbean Basin and their shifting dynamics with Argentine representatives on the ground.

The postwar situation

Both the Caribbean Basin countries and Argentina approached the end of World War II following markedly different geopolitical trajectories. The unique circumstances of the postwar period and the onset of the Cold War were pivotal in shaping their interactions. In the case of the Caribbean Basin's geopolitical significance, it stemmed from its strategic location for global commerce, abundant natural resources, and critical industries, including agriculture (sugar, rubber, bananas, tobacco, coffee), oil, and transportation. European powers – particularly Germany and Britain – had long exploited these sectors, influencing regional economies and infrastructures. However, the defeat of the Axis powers and Europe's postwar economic decline enabled the United States to consolidate its growing dominance, reshaping regional dynamics to align with its strategic and economic interests.

Furthermore, the U.S. Good Neighbor Policy marked a pivotal shift in its approach to Latin America, paradoxically enabling regional dictators to consolidate domestic control while preserving favourable relations with Washington (Grieb, 1978; Leuchtenberg 2009). However, the mid-1940s brought significant upheaval to Central America and the Caribbean as anti-authoritarian movements gained traction. In 1944, the Argentine ambassador in Mexico City noted that the "democratic sentiment of the world," fuelled by the Allied campaign against the Axis, was pushing the region toward a "readjustment of nations to democratic norms" (AHMREC)[2]. Similarly, the Chilean ambassador in Guatemala observed that events in one country would inevitably have "an unavoidable impact on the other republics" (AHCC)[3].

This new political landscape had immediate effects. First, it facilitated the rise of new democratic governments in the region, significantly altering the regional balance of power. That reactivated the region's tradition of mutual diplomatic and military intervention, pulling the entire Caribbean Basin into conflicts often framed as democracies versus dictatorships – though the reality was invariably more complex (Gleijeses, 1989; Ameringer, 1996). And second, these democracies pursued nationalist economic policies, seeking both economic allies to counter U.S. influence and its corporate dominance, and critiquing the presence of colonial enclaves that hindered strategic development.

This regional geopolitical trajectory, then, presented three major challenges for Caribbean Basin countries: dependence on a narrow range of export products, leaving their economies fragile and undiversified; the tensions arising from the legacies and ongoing presence of colonial powers and U.S. dominance, which constrained both their economic sovereignty and diplomatic freedom; and growing polarisation among the region's countries. Argentina capitalized on

opportunities in the Caribbean Basin to advance its strategic objectives precisely through these three challenges. What drove the efforts of Peronist diplomacy?

Argentina approached the post-World War II era with a notably distinct geopolitical trajectory, shaped by internal upheavals and its evolving foreign policy ambitions (Morgenfeld, 2019). Domestically, the 1943 coup orchestrated by the Grupo de Oficiales Unidos (GOU) represented a mix of military and democratic response to the political and economic instability that followed Hipólito Yrigoyen's fall in 1930. The rise of General Edelmiro Farrell to the presidency and the emergence of General Juan Domingo Perón as a prominent political figure in February 1944 – plus the weakness of domestic opposition parties – marked a pivotal turning point for Argentina (Trask, 1984; Dorn, 1999; Friedman, 2003; Leuchtenberg, 2009; McConahay, 2018; Doratioto, 2022). Under Perón's wings, strategic priorities focused on asserting political domestic equilibrium, advancing industrialization under a Five-Year Plan, and navigating the complex interplay of regional and global pressures (Lanus, 1984; Vilas, 1995; Romero, 1997; Cisneros & Escudé, 1999; Rapoport & Spiguel, 2009).

The main challenge for Argentina's foreign policy during these years stemmed from its belated severance of diplomatic relations with the Axis powers, closely tracked by the U.S. government (Conil & Ferrari, 1964; Schwartzberg, 2003, p. 1981). The State Department's isolation efforts reverberated across the continent, affecting Argentina's economic interests and diminishing its political stature, which, as the Mexican ambassador in Buenos Aires noted, deeply "hurt their national pride" – "un prestigio lesionado" (AHSRE).[4] While the pro-fascist and pro-Nazi leanings of certain GOU officers fuelled tensions with the Allies, these were not the sole source of discord. Argentina's economic ties to both Great Britain and Germany – exacerbated by a lack of complementarity with U.S. trade – and its diplomatic tradition of maintaining autonomy against U.S. imperialist ambitions also played crucial roles. Other key factors included the concerted diplomatic efforts of Latin American nations to counter the U.S.-led push for Argentina's international isolation. Together, these dynamics fostered a neutral and nationalist stance within Argentina's political elite following the GOU's ascent to power (Lanus, 1984).

The hesitation towards the Axis significantly impacted Argentina's continental influence, undermining a cornerstone of its diplomatic tradition and geopolitical priorities. Efforts to counter this isolation were swift once Perón assumed the presidency in mid-1946. Peronism prioritized South America as Argentina's primary sphere of influence, but Central America and the Caribbean were also viewed as arenas for expanded political and economic engagement. Here, Argentina sought to counter its isolation and advance its interests through trade, ideological diplomacy, and political engagement, positioning itself as a dynamic and autonomous actor in the evolving postwar order. As the region plunged into political turbulence, threatening to reshape the continental political landscape, Perón aimed to assert Argentina's voice and influence in these transformative dynamics. By early 1947, Perón's government launched its first initiative aimed

at aligning Argentine interests with the pressing challenges faced by the Caribbean Basin region.

Molinari's commission

A more round policy towards the Caribbean Basin by Perón's Argentina became evident in January 1947, six months after his inauguration. The year began with a tour led by Senator Diego Luis Molinari, a former member of the Radical Party who, like many, had shifted allegiance to the emerging Peronist ranks.[5] Molinari's mission aimed to promote regional integration under Argentine influence, building on existing outreach efforts to neighbouring countries (Cisneros & Escudé, 1999; Cervo, 2001; Rapoport & Spiguel, 2009). Unlike Argentina's frequent and institutionally supported interactions with its neighbours during the postwar period, its engagement with the Caribbean and Central America had been less regular. The region was largely seen as part of the U.S. sphere of influence, making Argentina's efforts to establish a presence in the region a shift from its traditional focus. Given Argentina's broader goal of contesting U.S. influence and reducing its capacity to exert pressure through diplomacy and propaganda, particularly in the region, strengthening ties with the countries of the Caribbean Basin emerged as a strategic priority. This became evident in the substantial costs of the tour and the ambitious offers made during the visits. In each country, Argentina strategically addressed shared regional concerns while focusing on issues of specific interest to individual nations.

This endeavour went beyond mere political propaganda and influence, reflecting a broader economic strategy aimed at boosting both traditional and non-traditional Argentine exports – a direct response to the economic pressures imposed by the U.S. This initiative was intricately tied to the industrialization process outlined in the First Five-Year Plan. Perón's faction within the GOU aimed to integrate organized workers and ally with industrialists, advancing a state-driven solution known as populism, similar to Lázaro Cárdenas in Mexico and Getúlio Vargas in Brazil (Murmis & Portantiero, 1972; Vilas, 1995; Romero, 1997; Ansaldi, 1998, 2006; Cramer, 1998; James, 2010; Horowicz, 2015; Pereyra, 2017).

The countries visited during Molinari's tour exhibited varying levels of agency and priorities in their engagement with the Argentine delegation, shaped by their distinct domestic and regional interests. The first stop was in Mexico for the inauguration of President Miguel Alemán, providing Molinari with a platform to present lectures on Argentina's labour legislation and domestic policies. Mexico, having aligned its foreign policy with the United States in recent years, had actively supported Argentina's isolation in multilateral forums, leveraging its position to solidify its regional standing (Loeza, 2016). After travelling by ship from Veracruz to the Caribbean Sea, the delegation arrived in Havana. Despite student protests against their presence, the Cuban government leveraged the visit to pursue economic agreements, like financial agreements and

investment in port infrastructure. These developments were celebrated with a grand reception aboard the Argentine battleship Rivadavia, which the Brazilian ambassador characterized as having "the intention to impress and dazzle" (AHI)[6].

The next country visited was the Dominican Republic, where the delegation was welcomed with a lavish banquet costing $8,000 (approximately $90,000 today). The Trujillo regime used the occasion to solidify ties by laying the groundwork for a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation. This agreement allowed the purchase of Dominican coffee and cocoa in exchange for arms and industrial goods, aligning Dominican economic and security interests with Argentina's trade ambitions. The Brazilian ambassador in Ciudad Trujillo noted that the visit was indicative of a "growing interest spurred by mutual antipathy" toward U.S. diplomats (AHI)[7]. Returning to the continent, the delegation visited Venezuela, where President Rómulo Betancourt's government, grappling with a domestic supply crisis, engaged with Molinari to explore the exchange of crude oil for Argentine food products (AHSRE)[8]. The brief stop in Panama highlighted regional interest in Molinari's proposal for a free trade zone before the mission continued to Guatemala, a nation whose strategic priorities would further underscore the interplay of regional and Argentine ambitions.

The official reception in Guatemala city, described by the head of the Brazilian diplomatic mission as "lacking any warmth," reflected mutual distrust and lingering tensions, largely stemming from President Juan José Arévalo's support for Argentine exiles. However, Guatemala as a priority was evident in the week-long stay, during which it used Molinari's presence to gauge Argentina's vision. The Guatemalan press received Molinari's portrayal of Perón's government as a "workers' regime" aiming to "eliminate the big monopolies" with enthusiasm, aligning with Guatemala's own economic and political aspirations. A particularly appealing proposal was the deployment of a merchant navy comprising dozens of ships to mitigate Guatemala's dependence on the United Fruit Company's Great White Fleet, an initiative that resonated with the country's long-standing struggle to assert economic sovereignty (Diario de Centro América)[9].

Guatemala's democratic regime also found resonance in Molinari's declaration that "it was a shame that colonies like Belize still existed," reflecting an effort to align Argentina's Malvinas claims with Guatemala's anti-colonial and anti-British sentiments. Further reinforcing this alignment, Argentine Foreign Minister Juan Atilio Bramuglia's public comments about British colonies during Molinari's visit encouraged Guatemalan officials (CIRMA)[10]. These moves alarmed British authorities, who wrongly assumed a close connection between President Arévalo and Perón, based on Arévalo's earlier exile in Argentina (NA)[11]. Arévalo, in conversations with the Chilean ambassador, emphasized Molinari's efforts to present Perón's leadership as a break from Farrell's policies. The mission appeared effective; the Brazilian ambassador noted a "radical change in the attitude of the Guatemalan government towards Argentina" following Molinari's visit (AHI)[12].

Heading southward, the delegation arrived in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, where Molinari's speeches were characterized by the Mexican ambassador – cautious of any authoritarian undertones given his government's support for the Spanish Republicans and the Allied cause – as "Peronist propaganda" aimed at garnering support for the "Falangist thesis of Hispanidad" and infused with a "deeply anti-Yankee sentiment." The ambassador also remarked on the notable absence of the U.S. ambassador from the city during the visit (Weld, 2019; AHSRE[13]). Peronist Argentina prioritized relations with General Francisco Franco in Spain, actively opposing his international isolation in United Nations debates. The parallels between their ideological narratives were significant. In Tegucigalpa, as in San Salvador days later, Molinari's visit was met with "unusual warmth," as noted by a Brazilian diplomat (AHI)[14].

Molinari's visit to Anastasio Somoza's Nicaragua was brief, focusing on discussions about a proposed treaty for economic and financial cooperation.[15] In Costa Rica, he devoted more time to promoting Perón's Tercera Vía, presenting it as a middle path between the Soviet Union and the United States amidst the intensifying global divide. He also highlighted Argentine food products – grains, meats, flours, and more – as competitively priced alternatives to U.S. imports (AHI)[16]. Additionally, Molinari facilitated confidential meetings across Central America to support Guatemalan President Arévalo's efforts to unify the isthmus under a single government (CIRMA)[17]. Arévalo had previously initiated discussions with El Salvador on this initiative, albeit with limited results (CIRMA)[18]. Costa Rica marked the final stop of Molinari's tour.

Argentina's engagement with the Caribbean Basin attracted close scrutiny from Chile and Brazil, driven by historical rivalries, economic competition, and Brazil's ambitions for continental hegemony. Chilean diplomats saw the competition as critical, with some lamenting their inability to rival Argentina's merchant navy (AHCC)[19]. The Chilean ambassador in Caracas stated that "an Argentine penetration in the Caribbean can benefit us in no way," while Chile's Foreign Ministry labelled Argentina's actions as "claimed continental dominance," fostering "distrust and suspicion in inter-American politics" and urging countermeasures (AHCC)[20]. Brazilian diplomats described Argentina's approach as bold; the ambassador in Guatemala praised its "intelligent" pursuit of political hegemony while critiquing Brazil's focus on Europe as Argentina and Mexico expanded their regional influence (AHI)[21].

By the end of his first regional tour, Molinari had undeniably captured attention—not only from powerful neighbours but also from the countries within the region. Surprisingly, there are few reactions found from the U.S. and the UK to the initiative. Nevertheless, expectations surrounding potential trade agreements, investments, financial ties, and political support resonated strategically according to each nation's interests. However, these expectations unfolded unevenly, reflecting the complexities of regional dynamics and Argentina's limited capacity to deliver on its promises.

Advances and tensions

As evident from the accounts on Molinari's 1947 tour, securing trade and financial agreements, as well as investment in strategic infrastructure, was a top priority in every country visited without exception. Perón and Molinari's efforts clearly aimed not only to secure access for Argentine products in regional markets but also to establish key economic connections. Political propaganda also played a central role in the project. It sought to smooth tensions with certain nations, such as Guatemala, improve Argentina's image after years of U.S. propaganda and pressure, and promote Perón's Third Position as an alternative vision amidst the looming global polarization of the Cold War (Sigal & Verón, 2023). While the next section will address the practical tensions of the Third Position narrative, this section focuses on the economic outcomes and the colonial question.

Following Molinari's visits, the outcomes began to materialize, though inconsistently and often falling short of expectations. An eager Costa Rican government, for instance, criticized the lack of tangible results a year after the numerous promises made, clearly reflecting Argentina's relative prioritization of the commitments made during the tour (AHCC)[22]. A similar scenario unfolded in the Dominican Republic. The Molinari Commission offered selling weapons to dictator Rafael Trujillo for the Dominican police, supporting his efforts to suppress opposition amid challenges stemming from a U.S.-led blockade. However, the Dominican Foreign Ministry rejected a first offer, deeming the prices too high. In response, the Argentine ambassador urged the Palacio San Martín to consider donating half of the proposed weapons – 100 out of 200 – as a gesture of "high inter-American convenience" and a means of fostering "positive assistance and effective rapprochement" (AHMREC)[23]. Despite these appeals, the Argentine Ministry of War stated it lacked the money required for such donations, and the proposal was ultimately denied (AHMREC)[24].

In Venezuela, Argentina's initiatives also fell short despite initial mutual interest. Venezuela's heavy reliance on oil posed economic challenges, as the country needed to import basic food supplies and manufactured goods. Argentina's response toward Caracas was diversified; technicians were sent to design migration and urban planning programs, while scholarships were offered to Venezuelan military personnel. Economically, trade efforts centred on exchanging oil for fats, natural oils, and legumes; however, unresolved disputes over corn and meat exports significantly strained relations (AHCC)[25]. The corn issue persisted despite Molinari's promise of 60 tons. Under U.S. pressure, Argentina prioritized selling its stock to England and Western Europe for postwar reconstruction, but the failure to secure these sales left Venezuela dissatisfied and with no benefits. Argentina defended its stance, claiming it "had not seen seriousness from the Venezuelan government" (AHSRE)[26]. This disappointment set the stage for further tensions regarding meat exports.

The original plan involved exchanging 400 tons of frozen meat for 27 million barrels of Venezuelan oil. However, Venezuelan envoys expressed concerns about the risk of disease in Argentine meat, following protests from the Colombian government. In response, Argentina tied grain and legume shipments to the acceptance of its meat, labelling Venezuela's objections as "a discourtesy" (AHSRE)[27]. Despite these tensions, in early 1948, Argentina announced a $25 million investment for constructing an "ultra-modern" refinery in Venezuela, as described by the Brazilian ambassador, aiming to address Argentina's production shortfalls (AHI)[28]. While there is no evidence that the refinery was ultimately built, the advanced negotiations highlight the Venezuelan government's priority to reduce reliance on European and U.S. oil companies, which refined its crude oil in Caribbean islands. This initiative furthermore underscored both countries' interests in reshaping regional economic dependencies.

Under Grau San Martín's second Authentic Revolutionary government, Cuba presented a stark contrast to other countries visited by the Molinari Commission, as its initiatives yielded notable outcomes. By mid-1948, construction began on a free trade zone in Matanzas, equipped with refrigeration and fumigation facilities to support regional goods distribution. This project capitalized on Cuba's role as a key buyer in the Caribbean, driven by the sugar boom and increased foreign exchange capacity. The Cuban economy's reliance on sugar and tobacco, combined with a significant decline in cattle production, heightened its dependence on food imports, positioning Argentina's pampas as essential. Later in 1948, the creation of a Cuban-Argentine bank, Banco de las Antillas Cubano-Argentino, with a $5 million capital investment, was announced, alongside plans for Argentine-funded cultural centres (AHI; AHCC)[29]. Trade with Central America and the Caribbean accounted for 6% of Argentina's exports, with Cuba leading as the region's largest trading partner, cementing its status as a strategic commercial hub (Belini, 2012, p. 292).

In Guatemala, Argentine interest, despite prior tensions, increased notably after Molinari's visit. Trade expanded with the influx of Argentine wines and industrial products, alongside the establishment of an agricultural society and a Guatemalan-Argentine cultural institute (AHCC)[30]. The most significant collaboration emerged in the drafting of an oil law following the discovery of substantial reserves in northern Guatemala. Argentina sent technicians from the state-owned Yacimientos Petrolíferos Federales (YPF) and offered scholarships for Guatemalans to train in Argentina. This cooperation culminated in the creation of Guatemala's National Petroleum Institute, reflecting a strong sectoral partnership between the two countries (AHSRE)[31].

However, where Guatemalans expected the most support was in the colonial question. The Arévalo administration had initiated a broad campaign across the continent to advocate for its stance on Belize. Perón's backing – emphasizing Argentina's claim over the Falklands – was significant, though bilateral relations remained ambiguous. Flavio Herrera, Guatemala's ambassador in Buenos Aires, noted in 1947 that the Argentine government was "still irritated" over prior

tensions, although Perón showed personal interest in the Belize issue. Herrera leveraged connections in the Argentine Congress and Senate through César Barros Hurtado, an Argentine diplomat who assisted him in lobbying for political support in the form of public statements (CIRMA)[32].

Foreign Minister Bramuglia assured Herrera's successor, Roberto Arzú, that while the Argentine press supported Guatemala, the Foreign Ministry had to proceed cautiously to protect subsidies tied to British trade (CIRMA)[33]. By late 1947, President Arévalo reached out to Perón on the topic, who responded briefly, referring to Guatemala as a "sister nation" without elaboration (CIRMA)[34].Months later, Perón wrote again, declaring that the two nations were united in pursuing the "continent's ideals" and expressing "solidarity" regarding Belize (CIRMA)[35]. Their interests aligned with the upcoming Inter-American Conference in Bogotá in early 1948, where Guatemalans and Venezuelans sought to address colonialism as part of a broader continental agreement.

Once the conference in Bogotá commenced, U.S. representatives swiftly took action. Secretary of State George Marshall held meetings with Bramuglia and Venezuelan Rómulo Betancourt to thwart a Guatemalan proposal condemning British colonialism, relying on the influential support of Brazil to bolster their efforts (NA; AHCC)[36]. The United States had assured the British it would defend their interests at the conference, even as the Foreign Office sent warships to Belizean waters in February as a show of force against Guatemala (see Véliz 2020). Both Argentina and Venezuela, however, avoided full alignment, instead facilitating informal meetings with Guatemala, Chile, and the United States. Chilean accounts suggest they reached a tentative agreement with Argentine, Venezuelan, and Guatemalan representatives on a mild proposal advocating for an end to colonialism, contingent on unanimous approval (AHCC; NA)[37].

The U.S. refusal to back any stance mentioning "colonialism" led to the collapse of the agreement and the adoption of a stronger resolution, which passed with abstentions from the United States, Dominican Republic, Chile, and Brazil. Later, during a commercial trip to London, Bramuglia softened his stance in discussions with Foreign Office officials. He attributed the radical positions of "hot-headed Latin American states," such as Venezuela and Guatemala, to Marshall's refusal to endorse a more moderate approach (NA; AHCC)[38]. Years after Molinari's tour, the region's priorities with Argentina remained largely focused on economic matters. Trade exchanges and financing for infrastructure projects and technical advisory programs were recorded across many countries. Nevertheless, unfulfilled promises, such as full support for Guatemala and Venezuela on the colonial issue, or arms sales to the Dominican Republic, highlighted the complexities of political issues. They also underscored discrepancies between secondary agents like Molinari and Argentine ambassadors with Perón and Bramuglia. These challenges were further intensified by escalating military crises in the region.

Ideology and pragmatism around the *Tercera Vía*

The years of 1947 and 1948 were a turning point in the continent and the region, significantly influenced by domestic and regional interpretations over the political upheavals in Asia, Central and Eastern Europe and its own political developments. The deepening divide within the Allied bloc, a divide that reverberated domestically in Latin American countries, often manifesting as a shift towards authoritarian anti-communism. This included severing ties with pro-government communist parties and unions or actively repressing them (Bethel & Roxborough, 1992). The Caribbean Basin acutely reflected global and continental trends, with a noticeable surge in anti-communist rhetoric and actions. Authoritarian regimes in the region actively sought to destabilize democratic governments by funding opposition groups and consolidating domestic control. Argentina's initial response to these unfolding dynamics was cautious; however, its political standing in the region was influenced by two key factors: its prior continental isolation, during which it aligned itself with similarly isolated countries in the region, often dictatorial regimes; and shifts in its domestic policy, marked by forceful measures to suppress opposition and an increasingly anti-communist rhetoric aligned more closely with that of the U.S. (Morgenfeld 2011, 2015).

One of the most notable cases for its repercussions was that of the new revolutionary government of Guatemala (AHMREC)[39]. Guatemala had pushed for Argentina, along with neighbour El Salvador's newly authoritarian government – which rose to power via a coup just one day after Guatemala's revolution in October 20, 1944, – not to be invited to the Chapultepec postwar Conference of 1945 (NARA)[40]. Part of this position, upon the arrival of a new Argentine ambassador to Guatemala, after more than a year with the position vacant in protest, Ambassador Adolfo Calvo had to wait more than 20 days to get a response from the Guatemalan foreign ministry. In September 1945, Calvo was informed that "the timing of his arrival was inconvenient," but Argentine Foreign Ministry Juan Cooke pressed for "submitting credentials as soon as possible." (AHMREC)[41]. Weeks later, indirect communication indicated Guatemala would not accept his credentials. Calvo demanded a categorical response, receiving instead a general statement about Argentina's unfulfilled international commitments. Cooke instructed Calvo to move the embassy to Honduras, exacerbating tensions with Guatemala (AHMREC)[42]. No Guatemalan officials attended Calvo's departure. In contrast, Honduras and El Salvador, both under authoritarian regimes, received him with a warm welcome (AHCC)[43].

Following Argentina's move to its embassy in Honduras, these two Central American countries showed support towards Argentina amid the publication of the State Department's Libro Azul and Uruguay's Larreta Doctrine, aimed at multilateral action against dictatorships (see Cerrano, 2019; Long & Friedman, 2020). Minister Cooke showed a "fundamental discrepancy" with the Doctrine and refused to respond (AHI)[44]. Tegucigalpa positioned against "any clear or disguised policy of intervention," while El Salvador "categorically rejected" it.

The Chilean ambassador noted both authoritarian countries sought "their own preservation," aligning their fragile positions with Argentina (AHCC)[45]. The situation in Argentina was not viewed as favourably in the rest of the countries in the region. In San José, Costa Rica, the Argentine minister launched a broad campaign against the "evil pamphlet," referring to the Libro Azul, but the press and publishers refused to publish any releases, ending up doing it himself with a borrowed mimeograph. From San José, he sent them to Managua, Nicaragua, where he received a rather neutral response. The press in San José, just like in Havana, started their own campaign against the Argentine government. This was attributed by the Argentine ambassador in Havana to the influence of communist unions opposed to new president Juan Domingo Perón government pressure over independent or internationally communist-affiliated unions. Notably, both the Costa Rican and Cuban governments were bolstered by communist parties within their ruling coalitions (AHMREC[46]; Potash, 1961).

For its part, Guatemalans rejected Argentina's stance, arguing that they were "alarmed by the existence in Argentina of war industries controlled by Germans" (CIRMA; AHMREC[47]; Véliz 2024). In an interview with the Chilean ambassador, with whom the Guatemalan government had excellent relations, the Guatemalan president confided he had made an effort to appear "as cold as possible" in response to Perón's repressive policy towards critics of his government, while Arévalo's Foreign Minister, Enrique Muñoz Meany, known for his anti-fascist ideology, also criticized the "Argentine arrogance" and its "dreams of grandeur" (AHCC)[48]. The antipathy was mutual, and evident. Faced with U.S. pressures, the positive response of many regional governments often led to frustration among Argentine diplomats. Rather than seeing these aligned positions as strategic geopolitical manoeuvrers, Argentine diplomats leaned towards paternalistic criticism. For example, minister Calvo, reflecting on the rejection in El Salvador of the Larreta Doctrine's publication and the supportive reception by the rest of the governments, attributed the regional stance to being overly influenced by "foreign interests." He argued that this made Caribbean and Central American countries passive actors in their geopolitical decisions, inevitably orbiting the U.S. without any semblance of autonomy (AHMREC)[49].

With Perón assuming power in mid-1946, a shift in Argentina's approach to the region became evident, marked by the arrival of new ambassadors and a more defined narrative regarding its continental stance. The Chilean ambassador in Guatemala City noted that Perón's administration was making "a great effort to recover its continental position and erase the effects" of previous foreign policies (AHCC)[50]. The Molinari Commission was a key element of this renewed strategy, designed to engage indiscriminately with all political regimes in the region, whether democratic or authoritarian. Its efforts to promote an early version of the Third Position – seeking a middle ground between the U.S. and the USSR – were evident at various points during the tour. However, this approach started to shift by mid-1947, as illustrated by the case of Nicaragua.

Dictator Anastasio Somoza faced pressures and international isolation after his May 1947 coup against successor Leonardo Argüello (See Gould, 1992). Democratic countries lobbied against Somoza's invitation to the Rio Conference of late 1947, aimed at continuing the objectives of the Chapultepec Conference with a regional security plan, uniform armament policy, and economic development plan. Argentina's Palacio San Martín aimed to define a clear stance on the Nicaraguan issue, but its response proved fragmented and contentious. Members of the Argentine embassy in Managua, including the workers' attaché, granted asylum to several political opponents of Somoza, openly defying the directives of Perón and Foreign Minister Bramuglia (Serán, 2017, pp. 137-144). Weeks after the coup, Bramuglia extended an invitation to the Nicaraguan ambassador in Buenos Aires, implicitly acknowledging the new regime. Argentina officially recognized Somoza's government shortly after, asserting uninterrupted relations. This action sparked continental backlash. The Brazilian ambassador in Ciudad Trujillo backlashed Argentina for "breaking the unity of action among American countries" (AHI)[51]. Days before, Perón had assured the Guatemalan ambassador in Buenos Aires that Argentina would wait for other countries' recognition (CIRMA)[52]. However, Perón's decision expedited recognition from Trujillo and Costa Rica. As the Rio Conference approached, Argentina, alongside the Dominican Republic and Honduras, both authoritarian governments, initially argued for inclusive invitations, while Mexico, Bolivia, Venezuela, Guatemala, Panama, and the United States, followed by the host Brazil, opposed the invitation, with Chile and Ecuador offering them lukewarm support. After a round of consultations, "the majority stated that an invitation should not be extended to a provisional regime" (AHMREU)[53].

Perón's government and authoritarian regimes in the Caribbean Basin were united by common interests amid pressures from the State Department and regional democracies to isolate them continentally. The Rio Conference had been delayed for years for those reasons, and it was not until General George Marshall took over U.S. policy towards the Americas, with substantial military backing, that these pressures diminished (NA)[54]. Perón's rapprochement with Truman's administration marked a significant shift, culminating in a formal invitation for Argentina to participate in the Rio Conference. This pivot also reinforced Perón's anti-communist rhetoric at home, aligning more closely with U.S. ideological priorities in the emerging Cold War context (Woods, 1979; Rapoport, 2009; Cisneros & Escudé, 1999; Morgenfeld, 2015).

Argentina's support for Somoza and alignment with authoritarian regimes was also evident in its warming relations with Dominican dictator Trujillo. Seeking to align with Argentina due to mutual isolation, Trujillo had sent a mission to Perón's 1946 inauguration. Molinari's arrival later saw numerous banquets, fostering "warm friendship and sympathy." Trujillo's advisors were invited to Buenos Aires, finalizing a trade agreement months later (AHCC)[55]. Military scholarships and reorganizing Dominican schools complemented this, with the Chilean ambassador noting Argentina's large diplomatic presence indicating

political objectives (AHCC)[56]. The Mexican ambassador in Managua warned of a secret mutual aid agreement possibly leading to conflict throughout the region (AHSRE)[57].

Argentina's rapprochement with authoritarian regimes often came at the expense of relations with the so-called democratic bloc, at times leading to outright hostility. As the Cold War began to shape domestic policies and escalate regional tensions, Argentine diplomats increasingly contributed to undermining democratic governments in Cuba, Venezuela, and Guatemala. However, it cannot be definitively stated that this was an explicit policy directed by Perón or Foreign Minister Bramuglia, as no clear records of such instructions exist. Nonetheless, authors like Semán argue that a shift did indeed occur. What is documented is Perón's authoritarian and anti-communist shift by 1948, alongside the deeply rooted anti-communist tradition within Argentine diplomacy (Semán, 2017, p. 9). These elements provide a framework for understanding Argentina's involvement in the region's military crises.

An indication of this shift in attitude was observed in Cuba. In 1947, a significant conspiracy emerged to overthrow the Grau San Martín administration in Cuba, allegedly supported by financial backing from Perón, according to interviews to Cuban officials conducted by Figueroa (1988). The support reportedly included funding for the purchase of military equipment in the United States to aid exiled conspirators. However, most of this arsenal was confiscated by U.S. customs agents, prompting Minister of Defence General Perez Damera to negotiate with Washington for arms for the Cuban government (Figueroa, 1988). The influence of Perón grew in Cuba after the work of Argentine Labour attaché, which sought to establish a foothold among Cuban workers. Peronist supporters actively promoted Third Position ideals in Cuba, backing union factions eager to follow a continental leader. They also extended their influence to student movements, including interactions with young leaders like Fidel Castro (Semán, 2017, p. 154). Additionally, the establishment of the continental Agrupación de Trabajadores Latinoamericanos (ATLAS) by Peronist supporters aimed to supplant Vicente Lombardo Toledano's communist CTAL and U.S.'s ORIT, proposing a "third position" in the anti-imperialist struggle. Each of these alliances undermined the strategies pursued by the Auténtico governments, further exacerbating political tensions (Sims 1992, p. 235; AHI[58]).

The Venezuelan case took on a sharper tone. In late 1947, the Argentine ambassador in Venezuela organized a special meeting, criticising former President Rómulo Betancourt's revolutionary government as "crumbling" and highlighting its support for Perón's opposition in Caracas. The Mexican ambassador reported the Argentine ambassador had "too many friends within the Venezuelan opposition," while the Chilean ambassador noted Argentine ties with the Venezuelan military (AHCC)[59]. Amidst Venezuela's political crisis in November 1948 and regional polarisation after the Costa Rican civil war, minister of Defense and future dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez visited Buenos Aires. His return was followed by a coup, after months of domestic unrest and political influence

from Dominican Trujillo. Perón promptly recognized the new government, denying involvement in Venezuelan politics. The Chilean ambassador confirmed suspicions of Argentine involvement, which were further echoed by a Venezuelan military prosecutor who accused several members of the Argentine embassy of advising the insurgents. Days later, the Argentine ambassador facilitated regional recognition with other countries, while Betancourt denounced Peronist diplomacy (AHMREC; AHCC)[60].

Similar recriminations emerged in Guatemala months later. Since 1948, the Argentine ambassador in Tegucigalpa reported Arévalo's international isolation and alleged Soviet ties, even falsely claiming Arévalo promoted the October 1948 coup in El Salvador with Soviet support, a claim he later retracted. The ambassador described much of Arévalo's Cabinet as part of "international communism," noting Arévalo protected Argentine dissidents, led an anti-religious policy, and refused to recognize the new authoritarian regimes in Venezuela and Peru (AHMREC)[61]. In July 1949, a military uprising against Arévalo saw Argentine ambassador Colonel Plácido Vilas negotiating with the rebels. After the failed rebellion, Vilas was accused of advising the rebels. He subsequently returned to Buenos Aires (AHI)[62]. In response, Arévalo's government launched an anti-Peronist campaign and welcomed Argentine dissidents (NARA)[63]. During the 1954 U.S.-sponsored coup, contradictions in Perón's diplomacy surfaced once more. Publicly, Argentina supported Guatemala's democratic regime, yet Perón privately imposed restrictions. Nevertheless, Argentine diplomats clandestinely assisted refugees, highlighting the tension between ideological commitments and pragmatic actions within Argentine diplomatic structure (Semán, 2017, pp. 206-211).

The involvement of Argentine diplomats in authoritarian movements in Venezuela, Guatemala and Cuba should not be viewed as an isolated incident. Not only did Perón's government faced similar criticism for its role in a military coup in Peru in 1948, but it was also accused by Chilean politicians and diplomats of inciting a similar movement within their borders that same year. Furthermore, since 1943, Perón and other military figures within the GOU were accused of pursuing an expansionist policy, supporting the coup in Bolivia in 1943 and promoting a similar one in Paraguay, in addition to their connections with the remnants of the Brazilian Ação Integralista Brasileira (Cisneros & Escudé, 1999, pp. 24-33). Nonetheless, Perón's continental policy – covering both economic growth, and political and ideological influence – encountered a major setback due to the crisis triggered by the partial failure of his First Economic Plan. As Argentina slipped into recession in the early 1950s, the need for a heightened focus on domestic stability became paramount (Belini, 2012, p. 304; Pereyra, 2017, pp. 166). Simultaneously, Argentina faced a domestic crisis, leading to the Liberation coup of 1955 against Perón.

Conclusions

As demonstrated, the negotiation points between Argentina and the Caribbean Basin's countries revolved around three key themes: economy, colonial issues, and ideological divergences. Firstly, Argentina's economic initiatives aimed to counter U.S. dominance by positioning itself as an alternative partner through trade, technical assistance, and investment in strategic sectors. However, regional responses – ranging from cautious collaboration to outright scepticism – exposed the limitations of Perón's economic outreach. Secondly, Argentina's alignment with anti-colonial critiques of British enclaves in Belize and the Falklands allowed it to present itself as a champion of regional sovereignty. Yet, the low geopolitical priority assigned to these issues led to frustration among Venezuelan and Guatemalan leaders, who had anticipated stronger Argentine support after its initial backing.

Despite some notable successes, the fragmented nature of Argentina's approach became evident in its inability to sustain cohesive alliances across the region. The ideological pivot after 1948, with an intensified anti-communist stance, further complicated its position. Relationships with authoritarian regimes like those of Trujillo and Somoza reflected a pragmatic yet contentious strategy, aligning with shared geopolitical interests while alienating democratic governments. The Third Position in the Caribbean Basin embodied a duality: ideologically, it sought to present Argentina as a mediator between Cold War blocs, but pragmatically, it often aligned with authoritarian regimes, prioritizing geopolitical leverage over democratic ideals. This tension underscores the limitations of Peronist policy when faced with the intricate realities of regional dynamics and domestic priorities. While pragmatic, this approach revealed contradictions within Argentina's foreign policy and highlighted the difficulties of striving for continental leadership amid an increasingly polarized geopolitical landscape.

Tensions between ideological goals and practical realities often surfaced within Argentina's diplomatic apparatus, such as tensions between ambassadors and the foreign ministry or divisions within embassies, a phenomenon also studied in the cases of Mexico and Brazil in their engagements with the region (Cervo, 2001; Keller, 2015; Véliz, 2023). Semán (2017) illustrates how Argentina's workers' attachés resisted Perón's anti-communist shift by leveraging international networks. Figures like Molinari and the Workers' Attachés frequently diverged from Perón's overarching directives or Bramuglia's cautious strategies. For instance, while Perón advocated anti-communism and alliances with authoritarian regimes, some embassy staff defied official orders, granting asylum to dissidents or covertly supporting democratizing efforts. Conversely, others intervened locally with radical anti-communist stances. These contradictions highlight a fragmented structure where individual agency and competing priorities complicated Argentina's early Cold War diplomacy. This analysis emphasizes the agency of diverse actors within the diplomatic structure, moving beyond traditional top-down frameworks of diplomacy. Finally, Argentina's

presence in the Caribbean Basin reflects a broader continuum in its geopolitical strategy, spanning from early twentieth-century calls for neutrality during World War I to Cold War engagements and later support for military dictatorships in the 1970s and 1980s. These phases demonstrate a recurring pattern of leveraging regional dynamics to assert Argentine autonomy and influence.

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Notes

1 AHI, Havana to Rio de Janeiro, 27 Mar. 1947, Est. 21, Prat. 2, vol. 4; AHCC, Guatemala to Santiago, 2 Feb. 1947, Box 2594.

2 AHMREC, México to Buenos Aires, 24 Oct. 1944, Box 8, File 1.

3 AHCC, Guatemala to Santiago, 16 Apr. 1944, Box 2209.

4 AHSRE, Buenos Aires to Mexico, 29 Jan.1945, No. 4-025, Exp. 510(82).

5 Molinari subsequently represented Argentina at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment in 1947, and by early 1948, he embarked on another, smaller-scale tour of the region.

6 AHI, Havana to Rio de Janeiro, 6 Feb. 1947, Est. 21, Prat. 2, vol. 2.

7 AHI, Ciudad Trujillo to Rio de Janeiro, 9 Jan. 1947, Est. 16, Prat. 5, Vol. 9.

8 AHSRE, Caracas to Mexico, 13 Jan. 1947, No. 74, exp. 87-0/614“47”.

9 Guatemala city, 21 Jan. 1947.

10 CIRMA, Buenos Aires to Guatemala, 29 Jan. 1947, GT-CIRMA-AH-045-004-002-006-175.

11 NA, Guatemala to London, 18 Feb. 1948, FO 371.

12 AHI, Guatemala to Rio de Janeiro, 31 Jan. 1947; Est. 19, Prat. 4, Vol. 1.

13 AHSRE, Tegucigalpa to Mexico, 11 Feb. 1947, No. 55, exp 570.

14 AHI, Guatemala to Rio de Janeiro, 19 Feb. 1947, Est. 19, Prat. 4, Vol. 1.

15 Managua to Santiago, 18 Mar. 1947, Box 2615.

16 AHI, San José to Rio de Janeiro, 5 Nov. 1948, Est. 44, Prat. 4, Vol. 6.

17 CIRMA, Molinari to Arévalo, 15 Feb. 1947, GT-CIRMA-AH-045-004-002-006-183.

18 CIRMA, San Salvador to Guatemala, 5 Feb. 1947, GT-CIRMA-AH-045-004-002-006-177.

19 AHCC, Havana to Santiago, 23 Jun. 1948, Box 2689.

20 AHCC, Santiago to Caracas, 18 Jan. 1947, Box 2628.

21 AHI, Guatemala to Itamaraty, 5 Nov. 1948, Est. 44, Prat. 4, vol. 3.

22 AHCC, San José to Santiago, 4 Feb. 1948, Box 2687.

23 AHMREC, Ciudad Trujillo to Buenos Aires, 13 Feb. 1947, Box 11, file 9.

24 AHMREC, Buenos Aires to Ciudad Trujillo, 31 Oct. 1947, Box 11, file 9.

25 AHCC, Caracas to Santiago, 12 Sep. 1946, Box 2495A.

26 AHSRE, Caracas to Mexico, 30 Jun. 1947, No. 891, exp. 870/640“47”.

27 AHSRE, Caracas to Mexico, 30 Nov. 1947, No. 1465, Exp. 87-0/614"47".

28 AHI, Ciudad Trujillo to Rio de Janeiro, 24 Mar. 1948, Est. 16, Prat. 2, Vol. 2.

29 AHI, Havana to Rio de Janeiro, 6 Aug. 1948, Est. 21; Prat. 2, Vol. 4; AHCC, Havana to Santiago, 3 Apr. 1948, Box 2689.

30 AHCC, Guatemala to Santiago, 11 Jan. 1946, Box 2424.

31 AHSRE, Guatemala to Mexico, 13 Oct. 1948, No. 1267, Exp. 728.1-0.

32 CIRMA, Herrera to Arévalo, 17 Jun. 1947, GT-CIRMA-AH-045-004-002-006-125.

33 CIRMA, Arzú to Arévalo, 1 Jun. 1948, GT-CIRMA-AH-045-004-002-006-413.

34 CIRMA, Perón to Arévalo, 3 Nov. 1947, GT-CIRMA-AH-045-004-002-006-297.

35 CIRMA, Perón to Arévalo, Mar. 1948, GT-CIRMA-AH-045-004-002-006-343.

36 NA, Washington to Foreign Office, 7 Ap. 1948, FO 371-7827; AHCC, Santia-go to Guatemala, 26 Aug. 1948, Box 2698.

37 AHCC, Santiago to Guatemala, 15 Jun. 1948, Box 2728; NA, Buenos Aires to London, 18 May. 1948, FO 371-68272.

38 NA, Buenos Aires to London, 18 May 1948, FO 371-68272; AHCC, Santiago to Guatemala, 24 Nov. 1948, Box 2728.

39 AHMREC, Guatemala to Buenos Aires, 15 Feb. 1944, Box 8, file 2.

40 NARA, Guatemala to Washington, 2 Aug. 1945, 814.002/8-245.

41 AHMREC, Guatemala to Buenos Aires, 8 Sep. 1945, Box 9, file 6; Buenos Aires to Guatemala, 17 Sep. 1945, Box 5, file 3.

42 AHMREC, Buenos Aires to Guatemala, 23 Oct. 1945, Box 9, file 6.

43 AHCC, Tegucigalpa to Santiago, 13 Nov. 1945, Box 2290.

44 AHI, Guatemala to Rio de Janeiro, 10 Dec. 1945, Est. 34, Prat. 2, Vol. 2.

45 AHCC, Tegucigalpa to Santiago, 9 Apr. 1946, Box 2424.

46 AHMREC, San José to Buenos Aires, 26 Apr. 1946, Box 6, file 1; Havana to Buenos Aires, 1 Mar. 1946, Box 5, file 3; Potash, 1961.

47 CIRMA, Washington to Guatemala, 2 Nov. 1945, GT-CIRMA-AH-045-004-002-006-756; AHMREC, Tegucigalpa to Buenos Aires, 8 Apr. 1946, Box 6, file 1.

48 AHCC, Guatemala to Santiago, 19 Nov. 1946, Box 2424; Guatemala to Santi-ago, 19 Nov. 1947, Box 2594.

49 AHMREC, Tegucigalpa to Buenos Aires, 27 Apr. 1946, Box 6, file 1.

50 AHCC, Guatemala to Santiago, 19 Nov. 1946, Box 2424.

51 AHI, Ciudad Trujillo to Rio de Janeiro, 21 Jun. 1947, Est. 16, Prat. 5, vol. 9.

52 CIRMA, Buenos Aires to Guatemala, 2 Jun. 1948, GT-CIRMA-AH-045-004-002-006-413.

53 AHMREU, Washington to Montevideo, 16 Jul. 1947, Box 1 file 16-234.

54 NA, Rio de Janeiro to London, 21 May 1946, FO 371-51905.

55 AHCC, Ciudad Trujillo to Santiago, 30 Jun. 1947, Box 2620ª.

56 AHCC, Ciudad Trujillo to Santiago, 17 Apr. 1948, Box 2682.

57 AHSRE, Managua to Mexico, 27 Jun. 1948, No. 345, Exp. 728.5-0/510 R.

58 AHI, Havana to Rio de Janeiro, 15 Jan. 1948, Estante 21, Praleteria 2, Volume 4.

59 AHCC, Caracas to Santiago, 20 Oct. 1948, Box 2760.

60 AHMREC, Caracas to Buenos Aires, 3 Dec. 1948, Box 15, file 1; AHCC, Ca-racas to Santiago, 28 Nov. 1948, Box 2760.

61 AHMREC, Guatemala to Buenos Aires, 11 Apr. 1949, Box 20, file 1.

62 AHI, Guatemala to Rio de Janeiro, 28 Jul. 1949, Est. 9, Prat. 4, Vol. 7.

63 NARA, Guatemala to Washington, 4 Nov. 1949, 714.35/11-449.

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AHCC: Archivo Histórico de la Cancillería Chilena, Santiago de Chile.
AHI: Archivo Historico de Itamaraty, Rio de Janeiro.
AHMREC: Archivo Histórico del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y de Culto, Buenos Aires.
AHMREU: Archivo Histórico de Relaciones Exteriores de Uruguay, Montevideo.
AHSRE: Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Ciudad de México.
CIRMA: Centro de Investigaciones Regionales y de Mesoamérica, Antigua Guatemala.
IAI: Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut, Berlin.
NA: National Archives, London.
NARA:National Archives and Records Administration, Maryland.