A Stalnakerian Analysis of Metafictive Statements

Merel Semeijn

University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands

Abstract

Because Stalnaker's common ground framework is focussed on cooperative information exchange, it is challenging to model fictional discourse. To this end, I develop an extension of Stalnaker's analysis of assertion that adds a temporary workspace to the common ground. I argue that my framework models metafictive discourse better than competing approaches that are based on adding unofficial common grounds.

1 Fiction in a Stalnakerian Framework

In Stalnaker's (1970) widely adopted pragmatic framework, assertions are modelled as updates of the 'common ground' (i.e. the set of propositions that are mutually presupposed by speaker and addressee in a conversation). When I assert "It is raining", I propose to update the common ground between me and my addressee with the proposition that it is raining. Because Stalnaker focussed on cooperative information exchanges (i.e. conversations in which gradually more and more information is added to the common ground because more and more propositions are asserted and accepted), it is challenging to model speech acts that do not seem to follow standard Gricean maxims, such as telling a lie or a fictional story which involves asserting things that you know not to be (literally) true.[1]

In this paper I propose a new approach to modelling fictional discourse in a Stalnakerian framework. I first discuss and present a formalization of the 'unofficial common ground accounts' offered by Stokke (2013) and Eckardt (2014), in section 2. Then, in section 3, I argue that Stokke and Eckardt run into difficulties modelling so-called 'metafictive statements' (i.e. reports on the content of a fictional work). In section 4, I introduce my own Stalnakerian analysis of fictional statements and argue that it adequately models metafictive statements. Instead of unofficial common grounds, my account involves what I call a temporary 'workspace'. Hence I dub my own account the 'workspace account'. Lastly, in section 5, I present a remaining challenge for my account and suggest directions for further research.

2 Unofficial Common Ground Accounts

A sharp contrast is drawn between assertions on the one hand and fictional statements on the other, in both Eckardt's linguistically motivated approach and Stokke's philosophically motivated approach to modelling fiction in a Stalnakerian framework. Assertions are updates of the 'official common ground': the set of mutually presupposed propositions concerning actual states of affairs. Fictional statements however, are proposals to update or create an 'unofficial common ground' related to the relevant fictional work: the set of propositions mutually presupposed by the addressee and author[2] of a story. As we engage in a fictional narrative the relevant unofficial

---

[1] Although these speech act are traditionally treated on a par, there are crucial differences (cf. Maier, forthcoming) such as that stereotypical lies, contrary to fictional statements, involve an intention to deceive.

[2] Hence, it is unofficial common ground between me and Tolkien that wizards exist. Alternatively, we can analyse this as part of the *official* common ground between the narrator and narratee encoded in the fiction. I will not further develop the role of the narrator in this paper.

common ground is updated with propositions expressing the content of the fictional story. Take fictional statement (1), taken from Tolkien's novel *The Lord of the Rings*:

(1)　　Frodo had a very trying time that afternoon.

As I read (1), I update the unofficial common ground specifically related to Tolkien's narrative with the proposition that Frodo had a very trying time on a particular afternoon.

　　Because we normally engage in different fictional narratives, a typical 'complete common ground' will contain one official common ground concerning actual states of affairs, and several unofficial common grounds related to different fictions (e.g. a *The Lord of the Rings* common ground, a *Harry Potter* common ground, a *Pride and Prejudice* common ground, etc.).[3] The complete common ground (C) can thus be represented as a n-tuple of one official common ground (C_0), and several numbered unofficial common grounds ($C_1, ..., C_n$):

$$C = \langle C_0, C_1, ..., C_n \rangle$$

Assertions are defined as proposals to update ($*$) the official common ground:

$$C +_A p = \langle C_0 * p, C_1, , C_n \rangle$$

Importantly, updating a common ground with some proposition p is usually formalized as $C \cup \{p\}$ rather than $C * p$, when common grounds are defined as sets of propositions ($C \cap p$ when common grounds are defined as sets of possible worlds). However, especially with fictional statements, simply unionizing sets of propositions leads to inconsistent common grounds. Further research is needed to determine what operator is suitable for such inconsistent updates (e.g. a belief revision-, Lewisian- or probability distribution-operator). $*$ may denote any such operator.

　　Fictional statements are defined as proposals to update an unofficial common ground. Here we must distinguish between two cases: Either a fictional statement is a proposal to update an already existing unofficial common ground (e.g. when continuing to read *The Lord of the Rings*), or a fictional statement is a proposal to create a new unofficial common ground (C_{BASE}) and update this common ground (e.g. when starting to read a new fictional novel):

$$C +_{F^i} p = \begin{cases} \langle C_0, C_1, ..., C_{i-1}, C_i * p, C_{i+1}, ..., C_n \rangle & \text{if } 1 \leq i \leq n, \\ \langle C_0, C_1, ..., C_n, C_{BASE} * p \rangle, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

　　This formalization raises the question what exactly is the content of C_{BASE}. In other words, what is mutually presupposed by the addressee and author of a fictional story when starting to engage in a new fictional narrative? Is C_{BASE} a copy of the official common ground ($C_{BASE} = C_0$), a tabula rasa ($C_{BASE} = \varnothing$), or something in between? Answering this question is outside the scope of this paper (but see for instance Lewis (1978), Ryan (1980) or Lamarque (1990)). In the formalizations presented in this paper I assume that C_{BASE} is a copy of the official common ground between addressee and author and hence contains all mutually presupposed propositions concerning actual states of affairs. Assuming C_{BASE} is a tabula rasa, or something in between a tabula rasa and a copy of the official common ground, is also compatible with my model but would lead to different formalizations.

---

[3]Alternatively, following the 'fragmented mind' programme (David), one could formulate an account involving *one* compartmentalized common ground. What are unofficial common grounds in Stokke's and Eckardt's accounts, are different compartments related to different fictions in this framework. Beliefs concerning actual states of affairs (part of the official common ground in the unofficial common ground accounts) are also structured in compartments of the same common ground.

3   Metafictive Discourse

So far I have focussed on Stokke's and Eckardt's analysis of fictional statements. However, there are also other types of discourse connected to our engagement with fiction. In this section, I argue that both Stokke and Eckardt run into difficulties concerning temporality and ascribing intuitively correct truth-values when modelling 'metafictive discourse'.

3.1   Conflicting Intuitions

Philosophers of fiction draw a distinction between (in Currie's (1990) terminology) 'fictional statements' which are taken directly from some fictional work (e.g. (1)) and 'metafictive statements'[4] which are statements that *are* about the content of a fictional work but that are not taken from it. For instance, after reading *The Lord of the Rings* people may start the following discussion:

> A: Did you know that Frodo was adopted by his uncle?
> B: Actually, Bilbo is Frodo's cousin.

So, after reading *The Lord of the Rings*, although I no longer accept or imagine the content that I entertained while engaging with the fictional statements of the narrative, I do not forget it. I remember that Bilbo is Frodo's cousin and I thus make a metafictive statement (2) about the content of a fictional work after engaging with it:

> (2)   Bilbo is Frodo's cousin.[5]

It seems that there are two conflicting intuitions that we want to account for when modelling our engagement with fiction: First, the acceptance of fictional truths is temporary (only for the purpose and duration of the conversation) and second, we do retain information about the fictional content *after* engaging with the narrative. I for example only momentarily accept propositions such as that wizards and hobbits exist for the purpose of reading *The Lord of the Rings*. However, even after engaging in the narrative, I do remember that Bilbo is Frodo's cousin and would correct someone who stated otherwise. Stokke and Eckardt run into difficulties trying to account for these conflicting intuitions.

Here it is important to point out a crucial difference between Stokke's and Eckardt's theories. In Eckardt's framework unofficial common grounds are non-temporal; once they come into existence they continue to exist. Because we engage with many different fictions over the course of our lives, a typical complete common ground consists of one official common ground and an ever-growing number of coexisting unofficial common grounds that are continuously accessible. In this framework we can treat metafictive statements like (2) as fictional statements: (2) is a proposal to update the unofficial common ground related to *The Lord of the Rings* with the proposition that Bilbo is Frodo's cousin. However, since unofficial common grounds are non-temporal in Eckardt's framework (i.e. they continue to be accessible after engaging with the

---

[4]There is the threat of a terminological confusion here: metafictive statements differ from so-called 'metafictional statements' (e.g. "Frodo is a fictional character" or "Frodo does not exist"). Further research will have to determine how to model metafictional statements in a Stalnakerian framework.

[5]We could also imagine this sentence occurring in *The Lord of the Rings*. This shows that whether a utterance is a fictional statement or a metafictive statement is largely a matter of context; the same sentence can function as a fictional statement (when found in a fictional work) or as a metafictive statement (when found in a discussion on the content of the fictional work such as (2)).

fictional narrative), Eckardt cannot account for the first intuition that fictional truths are only accepted temporarily.

Alternatively, Stokke analyses unofficial common grounds as essentially temporal, contrasting them with "more permanent, 'official', common grounds" (Stokke, 2013, p. 53), to account for the intuition that fictional statements are only accepted temporarily. He explains the use of metafictive discourse[6] by claiming that "an unofficial common ground need not be temporary in the sense of lasting a short time. There are arguably [unofficial] common grounds [that] continue to be operative for a very long time" (Stokke, 2013, p. 55). In other words, like in Eckardt's framework, metafictive statements are treated on a par with fictional statements (i.e. they are proposals to update an unofficial common ground). Therefore, in order to account for metafictive discourse, Stokke has to admit that unofficial common grounds remain operative long after engaging with the fictional narrative. But in what sense are unofficial common grounds that remain accessible after engaging with a fictional narrative (as in Eckardt's theory) still temporal? It seems that Stokke runs into difficulties trying to account for both intuitions described above, ending up with unofficial common grounds that are both essentially temporal and continuously operative.

3.2   Lewis' fiction-operator

Now that the issues concerning temporality raised by metafictive statements for the unofficial common ground accounts have been discussed, let's further examine the nature of metafictive statements. I argue that the analysis of metafictive statements that Stokke and Eckardt adhere to runs into difficulties with ascribing intuitively correct truth-values.

A prominent theory in the philosophy of fiction is that a fictional statement p (e.g. (1)) is a truth-valueless mandate or proposal from the author to imagine p.[7] The nature of *metafictive* statements (e.g. (2)) on the other hand is still a matter of debate. Currie (1990) and others (e.g. Zucchi (2017) and Ninan (2017)) claim that metafictive statements are not mandates to imagine but rather abbreviations of assertions about the content of particular fictional works under a Lewisian (1978) 'In (the worlds compatible with) fiction x'-operator. Hence, (2) is actually an abbreviation of metafictive statement (3):

  (3)   In *the Lord of the Rings*, Bilbo is Frodo's cousin.

In other words, metafictive statements (with overt or covert fiction-operators) are meant to make assertions about actual states of affairs in the world (i.e. the content of a particular work of fiction) and are true or false depending on how the actual world is.

By contrast, Recanati (2002), Evans (1982) and Walton (1990) claim that both metafictive statements such as (2) *and* metafictive statements with an overt fiction-operator such as (3) are, like fictional statements, mandates to imagine the described events. They are truth-valueless invitations to continue the pretense of the *The Lord of the Rings* stories. The unofficial common ground framework, by treating fictional statements and metafictive statements on a par, seems to assume this analysis of metafictive statements.[8] There are independent reasons to prefer

---

[6]Stokke discusses the statement "Hobbits have hairy feet." (Stokke, 2013, p. 55) as an answer to the question "Who has hairy feet?". Stokke's example is somewhat complicated; it is not immediately clear whether the statement occurs in the context of a discussion on the content of *The Lord of the Rings*. However, we can interpret it as a metafictive statement (i.e. a statement about the content of *The Lord of the Rings*) because it is perfectly reasonable to reply: "Okay, true... But let's not talk about *The Lord of the Rings* right now."

[7]This consensus view has recently been challenged by Matravers (2014). See section 4.1.

[8]Stokke only discusses metafictive statements without overt fiction-operator. Possibly, metafictive statements with overt fiction-operator can be analysed as operating on the official common ground.

Currie's analysis, related to the behaviour of indexicals (See Zucchi (2017)). More importantly, the Recanati/Evans/Walton view does not allow us to ascribe truth values to metafictive statements; they are, like fictional statements, truth-valueless mandates to imagine. However, as Currie (1990) and Zucchi (2017) argue, we intuitively *do* want to maintain that "(In *The Lord of the Rings*,) Bilbo is Frodo's cousin." is a true statement. In this paper I follow Currie's analysis of metafictive discourse.

4   The Workspace Account

Now that I have discussed the unofficial common ground accounts and the challenge posed by metafictive discourse, I turn to my own version of a Stalnakerian model of fictional discourse. I will first present my Stalnakerian model of fictional statements and assertions (section 4.1). Second, I will discuss my analysis of metafictive statements and argue that it avoids the difficulties raised for the unofficial common ground accounts (section 4.2).

4.1   Fictional Statements and Assertions

As I mentioned in the introduction, my account involves a concept similar to the unofficial common ground. Following Stokke and Eckardt, I analyse fictional statements as proposals to update a common ground separate from the official common ground, that contains the shared presuppositions between author and addressee of the fictional story. However, in my account, this common ground truly temporal; it is operative or active solely for the purpose and solely for the duration of the fictional discourse. I hence dub it the 'workspace'. As soon as we stop entertaining the propositions of some fictional narrative (e.g. as soon as I stop reading *The Lord of the Rings*), the content of the workspace evaporates and it becomes inactive again.

Using a recent insight from the philosophy of fiction due to Matravers (2014) I claim that this is the case for both fictional and non-fictional discourse. Matravers challenges the widely adopted view that whereas nonfictional truths are to be believed, fictional truths are to be imagined. In fact, our primary engagement with fictional narratives (e.g. *The Lord of the Rings*) involves the essentially the same cognitive processes as our primary engagement with nonfictional narratives (e.g. a vivid biography); whether a narrative is fictional or non-fictional, entertaining its content involves the same cognitive mechanisms. Likewise, in my framework common ground updates are formalized as a two-step algorithm where the first step – updating a workspace – is uniform for fiction and non-fiction.[9] I define this first step as an update ($*$) on an ordered pair consisting of an official common ground (C) and a workspace (W) (which, when engaging in a new narrative, is inactive up to that point):

$$\langle C, W \rangle + p = \langle C, W * p \rangle$$

With the first update (i.e. with the first proposition of the narrative we are entertaining) the workspace becomes active. It then remains active during following updates caused by the same, possibly multi-sentence, discourse. In other words, when entertaining propositions from some narrative (e.g. *The Lord of the Rings* or a newspaper article), I activate the workspace with my first update and then continue to further update this workspace. When I stop entertaining propositions from this narrative (i.e. as I stop reading or listening), the workspace loses its content and becomes inactive again. As I subsequently engage in a new narrative (e.g. *Harry Potter*), I again update, and thereby activate, the same workspace.

---

[9]A similar idea is developed in Kamp's (2016) mentalistic framework. Kamp introduces a compartment (K_{dis}) for the neutral place where we build representations of the content of the current discourse before forming judgements about the truth of the propositions expressed by K_{dis}.

What differentiates assertions from fictional statements is how, at the end of the discourse, they update the official common ground: whether the content of the updated workspace is adopted as belief (for nonfiction) or as metafictive belief (for fiction). Hence, in the second step of the algorithm, I define assertions and fictional statements as different 'closure operations' that take an ordered pair $\langle C, W \rangle$ containing an updated, active workspace, and return an ordered pair with a new official common ground and an inactive workspace.

In the case of assertion the updated workspace is adopted as the new official common ground. As discussed in 2, I assume that an inactive workspace is a copy of the current official common ground (instead of for instance a tabula rasa) so that asserting a proposition p boils down to updating the official common ground C to $C * p$ (as in the traditional Stalnakerian framework):

$$\text{Assertive closure: } \langle C, W \rangle \rightarrow \langle W, W \rangle$$

Assuming we are keeping track of n fictions $(1, ..., n)$, fictional statements return an ordered pair in which the updated workspace is added to the original official common ground under an 'In fiction i'-operator. This is meant to model the fact that once a fictional discourse ends (e.g. once I put down *The Lord of the Rings*) participants are no longer invited to imagine any propositions but do maintain metafictive beliefs about the content of the fictional narrative (e.g. In *The Lord of the Rings*, Frodo is adopted by his cousin). In the formalization below the 'In fiction i'-operator ($\Box_i$) takes as its argument the proposition $\cap W$, which is the intersection of the propositions in W:

$$\text{Fictive}^i \text{ closure: } \langle C, W \rangle \rightarrow \langle C \cup \{\Box_i(\cap W)\}, C \cup \{\Box_i(\cap W)\} \rangle$$

So after engaging with some fictional narrative i, the official common ground will contain metafictive beliefs concerning i. The workspace becomes an inactive copy of this official common ground (which now also contains metafictive beliefs). Because we normally engage in different fictional narratives, a typical official common ground will contain (apart from beliefs about the actual world) metafictive beliefs about several distinct fictions under different 'In fiction i'-operators. In this sense there are in fact multiple different fictive closure operators related to different fictional works.

In sum, the workspace account analyses assertions as proposals to update a workspace and as a result of that adopt the workspace as the new official common ground (i.e. as belief). Fictional statements are proposals to update a workspace and as a result of that update the official common ground with the content of the workspace under the relevant 'In fiction i'-operator (i.e. with metafictive beliefs). Rather than using different update rules for fictional statements and assertions (as Stokke and Eckardt do), I thus propose a uniform workspace update, along with distinct assertive and fictive closure operations.

4.2   Metafictive Statements

Now that I have presented my version of a Stalnakerian model of fictional statements, in this section, I present my analysis of metafictive statements. I argue that my account avoids the difficulties described in section 3 (concerning temporality and ascribing intuitively correct truth-values) that Stokke and Eckardt run into.

I claim that as a result of entertaining fictional propositions, we add metafictive beliefs to the *official* common ground. Metafictive statements are reports on these metafictive beliefs. Hence, I model a metafictive statement such as (2) or (3) (i.e. with overt or covert 'In fiction i'-operator) as a proposal to update the *official* common ground with (3). Or, in other words, as a plain assertion about actual states of affairs. Any arbitrary metafictive proposition p consists

of an 'In fiction i'-operator related to some fiction i ($\square_i$), and some proposition (q): $p = \square_i q$. We can thus represent metafictive statements by substituting p for $\square_i q$ in the two-step algorithm for assertions. First, we update the workspace with $\square_i q$:

$$\langle C, W \rangle + \square_i q = \langle C, W * \square_i q \rangle$$

At the end of the (possibly multi-sentence) discourse about the content of fiction i, we perform regular assertive closure: $\langle C, W \rangle \rightarrow \langle W, W \rangle$ by which the updated workspace is adopted as the new official common ground (which now also contains $\square_i q$). In other words, engaging in a fictional narrative i or engaging in a discussion on the content of i are two distinct ways of obtaining the same result: metafictive beliefs concerning i. The intuitive difference between the two processes lies in what kind of propositions you entertain (i.e. update your workspace with) during the discourse; whether you entertain propositions such as "Bilbo is Frodo's cousin" or propositions such as "In *The Lord of the Rings*, Bilbo is Frodo's cousin".

By analysing metafictive statements as plain assertions about actual states of affairs, I adopt Currie's view of metafictive statements. Hence I allow, unlike Stokke and Eckardt, that we ascribe truth-values to metafictive statements such as (3) just as we do with assertions. My account also adequately models the temporary acceptance of fictional propositions. After engaging in *The Lord of the Rings*, the fictional content of our workspace evaporates. Hence we accept propositions, such as that wizards exist, only temporarily. The metafictive beliefs that we subsequently adopt become part of the official common ground and are therefore more 'permanent' (i.e. as permanent as ordinary beliefs). Thus, after engaging in *The Lord of the Rings* I do remember that (in *The Lord of the Rings*,) Bilbo is Frodo's cousin. When engaging in metafictive discourse, we make regular assertions and therefore no 'permanent' unofficial common ground or workspace related to *The Lord of the Rings* is called for.

5   Picking up Where We Left of

In this section I discuss a challenge for my account: how do we model continuing to engage in a fictional narrative after taking a break? I suggest two directions in which to further develop the workspace account and hence meet this challenge.

A feature of my model is that after engaging in a fictional narrative, all that we are left with are metafictive beliefs. It is therefore unclear how we can for instance interpret "Gollum [...] held aloft the ring" after taking a break from reading *The Lord of the Rings*. What ring is Tolkien writing about? The new workspace will have to contain the propositions that were included in the original workspace just before fictive closure (e.g. a description of some unique ring) in order to account for such anaphoric links. However, the official common ground (and hence the new workspace) only contains metafictive propositions based on this original workspace.[10] My account is in need of some further mechanism to explain how we are able to retrieve the relevant propositions embedded under 'In fiction i'-operators.

A possible solution is to claim that, apart from adding metafictive propositions to the official common ground, fictive closure also involves retaining a copy of the updated workspace (which is adopted as new workspace when continuing in the same narrative). This results in a theory resembling Stokke's and Eckardt's accounts, involving (something akin to) unofficial common grounds. However, this move invites the problems concerning temporality associated with the

---

[10]This problem does not arise with non-fictional narratives because with assertive closure we adopt the updated workspace as the new official common ground. Hence, when continuing in a non-fictional narrative, the new workspace will contain (at least) all propositions that were included in the original workspace.

unofficial common ground accounts; if we maintain that readers of *The Lord of the Rings* hold onto a *The Lord of the Rings*-workspace containing propositions such as that wizards exist, we no longer account for the intuition that we accept such fictional propositions only temporarily.

A more promising solution is to maintain that after engaging in a fictional narrative we *only* retain metafictive beliefs. Hence a further mechanism is needed to explain how we can, when continuing in a familiar narrative, fill in our workspace appropriately, based on the available metafictive propositions in the official common ground. At first sight this seems like a straightforward task. In fictive closure you copy the updated workspace in its entirety and add it to the official common ground under an 'In fiction *i*'-operator. So, when you continue to engage in a fictional narrative after taking a break, you simply reverse the fictive closure (i.e. perform 'fictive opening'): identify the relevant fiction-operator and copy everything that is under this operator to the workspace.

The difficulty with this approach is that in Stalnaker's framework common grounds have no structure; they are simply sets of propositions (which in turn are sets of possible worlds) that determine a unique set of possible worlds. When we perform fictive closure we update the official common ground with (metafictive) propositions and thus further limit this set of possible worlds (e.g. we exclude worlds in which in the novel *The Lord of the Rings*, Bilbo is not Frodo's cousin). In other words, there is no 'metafictive *The Lord of the Rings*' marker in the official common ground and hence no straightforward mechanism to select the appropriate propositions to perform fictive opening.

A framework that does place structure on propositions and hence allows for metafictive markers, is the so-called 'structured propositions' framework (See for instance Soames (1985) and Cresswell (1985)). Propositions are not sets of possible worlds, but complex entities with a structure similar to the sentences that expresses them and with constituents that carry the semantic values of expressions occurring in these sentences. For example, in Soames' neo-Russellian approach the sentence "Scott does not run" expresses the following proposition:

$$< NEG, << s >, R >>$$

Here, s is Scott, R is the property of running and NEG is the truth function for negation. Thus, the negation operator is a distinct constituent of the proposition expressed. We can analyse the 'In fiction i'-operator in metafictive statements in a similar fashion. The following is a simplified representation of the proposition expressed by metafictive statement (3):

$$< \Box_i, << b, f >, C >>$$

Here, b is Bilbo, f is Frodo, C is the property of being someone's cousin and $\Box_i$ is the 'In *The Lord of the Rings*'-operator. In this way we place structure on propositions that allows for metafictive markers and hence enables us to perform fictive opening.

Perhaps a more suitable framework for dealing with the problem of anaphoric links (described above) is DRT (Discourse Representation Theory) developed by Kamp (1981)[11], because it is both structured and dynamic. In this framework NP's in a discourse are mapped to 'discourse referents' that are placed under several conditions in a DRS (Discourse Representation Structure). For example (3) is represented as follows:

---

[11]A similar theory has been developed by Heim (1982) independently.

$$\Box_i \quad \boxed{\begin{array}{c} x,\ y \\ \hline \text{Bilbo(x)} \\ \text{Frodo(y)} \\ \text{cousin(x, y)} \end{array}}$$

Hereby we place structure on propositions that includes metafictive markers and hence allows us to to select the appropriate propositions to perform fictive opening.

6   Conclusions

I have argued that Stokke's and Eckardt's unofficial common ground accounts, in which fictional statements are proposals to update a separate unofficial common ground, run into difficulties with modelling metafictive discourse. I have presented an alternative Stalnakerian analysis of fictional statements: the workspace account. Rather than using different update rules for fictional statements and assertions, I propose a uniform workspace update along with distinct assertive and fictive closure operations. I have argued that my account avoids the difficulties with modelling metafictive discourse associated with the unofficial common ground accounts. A standing challenge is to adequately model how we can continue to engage in a fictional narrative after taking a break.

References

Cresswell, M. J. (1985). *Structured meanings: The Semantics of Propositional Attitudes*. MIT Press.

Currie, G. (1990). *The Nature of Fiction*. Cambridge University Press.

David, M. The Fragmented Mind: Agency, Rationality, Belief. http://fragmentationproject.uni-graz.at/.

Eckardt, R. (2014). *The Semantics of Free Indirect Discourse*, volume 31. Brill Publishers.

Evans, G. (1982). *The Varieties of Reference*, volume 10. Oxford University Press.

Heim, I. (1982). *The Semantics of Definite and Indefinite Noun Phrases*. PhD thesis, UMass Amherst.

Kamp, H. (1981). A theory of truth and semantic representation. In Groenendijk, J. A. G., Janssen, T. M. V., and Stokhof, M. B. J., editors, *Formal Methods in the Study of Language, Part 1*, pages 277–322. Blackwell Publishers Ltd, Oxford, UK.

Kamp, H. (2016). Entity representations and articulated contexts: An exploration of the semantics and pragmatics of definite noun phrases. Working paper.

Lamarque, P. (1990). Reasoning to what is true in fiction. *Argumentation*, 4(3):333–346.

Lewis, D. (1978). Truth in Fiction. *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 15(1):37–46.

Maier, E. Lying and fiction. In Meibauer, J., editor, *The Oxford Handbook of Lying*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.

Matravers, D. (2014). *Fiction and Narrative.* Oxford University Press.

Ninan, D. (2017). Names in fiction. *Theoretical Linguistics*, 43(1-2).

Recanati, F. (2002). Varieties of simulation. In Proust, J. and Dokic, J., editors, *Simulation and Knowledge of Action*, pages 151–171. John Benjamins Publishing.

Ryan, M. L. (1980). Fiction, non-factuals, and the principle of minimal departure. *Topics in Catalysis*, 9(4):403–422.

Soames, S. (1985). Lost innocence. *Linguistics and Philosophy*, 8(1):59–71.

Stalnaker, R. C. (1970). Pragmatics. *Synthese*, 22(1-2):272–289.

Stokke, A. (2013). Lying and asserting. *Journal of Philosophy*, 110(1):33–60.

Walton, K. L. (1990). *Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts.* Harvard University Press.

Zucchi, S. (2017). Games of make-believe and factual information. *Theoretical Linguistics*, 43(1-2).